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New Republic

A.N.C.

WHAT IS MALIK UP TO?

By JOSEPH P. LASH

WESTERN UNITY: WHEN AND HOW?

By MICHAEL STRAIGHT

MacARTHUR TRIES TO MAKE POLICY

AN EDITORIAL

HAROLD L. ICKES: POLITICS UEBER ALLES

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

Reports on political affairs reaching Washington from nearly every part of the country are causing increasing alarm among Administration leaders. They recognize that this is probably the low point in the Congressional campaign. But it is nevertheless a fact that the constant attacks by the McCarthys, Wherrys *et al.* have had a demoralizing effect that is harmful not only to the Democratic Administration but to national morale at an extremely critical time.

George F. Kennan, State Department counsellor who left last week for a year's leave, warned that the country must take care to avoid hasty and emotional judgments as it enters areas where political and military considerations are closely intermingled. "We must deal with our problems coolly and carefully," he said, "realizing we are now, for the first time as a nation, facing the test of maturity."

According to the more alarming reports of the state of public opinion, we are a long way from Kennan's ideal. It's true that both the President and the Secretary of State have been too quiet too long. The President's careful message to Congress on the Korean crisis was forceful and meaty, but it was presented in an indigestible form. Few newspapers printed the full text, nor was it broadcast. Perhaps it should have been the basis for half a dozen radio speeches by the President instead of just one.

The reports Washington is getting indicate that the country is ready for any sacrifice if it only knew what was demanded and where it was going. But there also seems to be a failure to understand the meaning of partial mobilization, partial war with Russia. But that is what the top officials here believe we must adjust ourselves to—not just this year or next, but for many years. That will be a severe test of our maturity as a nation.

To try to recapture their lost leadership, both the President and Acheson soon will be on the air again. Speeches are now being prepared.

Here is a true story that sounds like someone's old gag. A member of President Truman's Cabinet recently wrote a letter to congratulate a fellow bureaucrat who had just been appointed to a high federal office. Because the man was a Southerner, the Cabinet officer ended his letter with a reference to the famous remark William L. Yancey made when he introduced Jefferson Davis at Montgomery, Alabama, the night before Davis' inaugural as President of the Confederate States.

"As William L. Yancey said on another famous occasion," the Cabinet officer's letter said, "'I think the man and the hour have met'."

A few days later the newly-appointed federal official replied, thanking the Cabinet officer for his letter and concluding with this sentence: "The next time you see Bill Yancey, please give him my regards."

The story behind the story of why our stockpiles of critical materials are far behind schedule is the old one of business-as-usual: "Buy American," and too little power in the hands of those who have the job to do. It's hard to blame any one individual, yet it is a sad commentary on our preparedness when the chairman of the Munitions Board says there are nine materials "for which we have on hand less than 20 percent of the stockpile objective" and 34 materials "for which our supplies on hand are less than 50 percent of our total stockpile objectives."

Why are the stockpiles so far behind in their job? One reason is that some materials are in extremely short supply and can't be had at any price. Another is that some producers, both foreign and domestic, refuse to increase their productive capacity, fearing that when the stockpile is full they will be left with unneeded plant. Another reason for the failure of the stockpilers is that they have been up against strong competition from hoarders in business, who have tried to get all available supplies of scarce materials.

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Congress has a bad record as far as copper is concerned. A wartime act abolished the tariff of two cents a pound on copper, but the act expired June 30. The House passed a bill extending the suspension of the copper tariff, but the Senate Finance Committee, under the influence of Western Senators, has pigeonholed it. If there were a great surplus of copper in the United States perhaps some argument could be made for the copper tariff, but the truth is that the industrial stockpile is almost nonexistent. And in wartime an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 additional tons are needed every year.

To obtain materials for the stockpile, the Administration wants allocation powers so that it will not have to compete in the market with private business. One difficulty has been "the availability of materials under the normal free-market conditions under which we operate," Carl Rolle, adviser to the Munitions Board chairman, told the House Appropriations Committee. "In other words, the stuff has been going into commercial use and is not available for stockpiling."

Virtual agreement has been reached between the State and Defense Departments and General MacArthur over the Japanese peace treaty. But the question of Chinese participation in the treaty conference has not been settled and won't be for some months. The Chinese Nationalists are recognized by seven of the thirteen members of the Far Eastern Commission; the other six have recognized the Chinese Communists. The earliest date a peace conference could be held under the present schedule is February or March.

Notes. Most Washington officials agree that Indo-China and Burma are much greater danger spots than Iran or Yugoslavia. . . . Some Washington wiseacres are saying that only Douglas MacArthur can win the election for the Democrats. . . . Friends of Secretary Acheson insist that he is standing up well against the political attacks being made on him, that he refuses to worry too much about them and that he is keeping his eye on the ball. . . . In his latest press conferences, President Truman has shown increasing caution in answering questions on military and foreign affairs.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Dianetics

SIR: What a wonderful public service *NR* has performed in printing Dr. Martin Gumpert's debunk of the dianetics craze! Some of my intelligent friends (like Mr. Hubbard, they are science-fiction addicts) have fallen for his pseudo-scientific, high-school-type secret-language "new discovery." Like Mr. Hubbard, they reject psychoanalysis, but have swallowed psychoanalytic concepts in his "disguised and distorted" version.

I'm particularly glad you selected Dr. Gumpert for the review and not on a psychoanalyst, because, as far as my dianetics-crazed friends are concerned, anyone who approves of psychoanalysis, or worse, is an analyst himself, is not fit to criticize the venerable Dr. Hubbard. After all, they say, analysts are merely worried that they might lose their livelihood to the Toni-home-analysts.

Washington, D. C. INGE KAISER

New Holy Roman Empire

SIR: It is said that King Arthur was not king of all England (or Britain), but that he organized the other little kingdoms for defense against the Danes.

Franco, the dictator of Spain, has been accepted as our ally against Russia. He might, using his army, which needs exercise, take over the governments of France, Italy, Belgium and Germany, make use of the manufacturers of those countries to equip a great army, and so defend the free countries against Russian despotism.

For this purpose he would have the backing of the Fascists and Nazis, and of a considerable following in France, and, of course, the blessing of Rome.

What shall we call it? Why, the Holy Roman Empire, of course.

Oxford, Pa. ARCHIBALD CRAIG

McCarthy and the Communists

In the *New Republic* of May 8, Harold Ickes discussed how Joe McCarthy got into the US Senate. He stated that: "Harold Christoffel, together with two of his cronies, Robert Buse and Al Hirsch, urged fellow members [of the powerful Allis-Chalmers UAW Local 248] to register as Republicans, and threw the strength of their union, in a closely contested election, to McCarthy. Robert Buse succeeded Christoffel as president of the local, which continued to be Communist-dominated until President Philip Murray of the CIO finally cleaned it up."

Mr. Hirsch has written us a letter, too long and detailed to print, denying this charge. He says that Christoffel was at the time (1946) and until well into the year 1947 in the Army in Japan; that CIO policy in Wisconsin was to urge its members to vote for progressives in the Democratic primaries; that a number of such candidates were successful; that former Senator Robert M. LaFollette confused the issues in Wisconsin by tying himself to the conservative Republican Party; that if CIO members voted in the Republican primary for McCarthy and against LaFollette, they "perhaps did so on the theory that the Democratic Senatorial candidate, Howard McMurray, would stand a better chance of defeating . . . McCarthy than . . . LaFollette."

Mr. Ickes comments on Mr. Hirsch's statement by saying that it is obviously impossible for anyone to tell exactly how CIO members voted in a secret ballot, or what their motives were. However, his information came from what he regarded as reliable sources in Wisconsin.

Harold Christoffel is now under sentence of two to six years in prison for having denied before the Labor Committee of the House of Representatives that he is a Communist. – THE EDITORS

Thomas As a Liberal

SIR: Heaven knows Senator Elmer Thomas is no "self-styled liberal." But to brand Representative Mike Monroney as such betrays a definite prejudice on the part of your correspondent (the *NR*, August 7).

Thomas had the backing of the CIO, AFL, Roscoe Dunjee of the Oklahoma City *Black Dispatch*, and the Oklahoma Farmers' Union. Not an especially conservative bunch.

On the other hand Monroney was supported by the American Farm Bureau Federation—hardly a liberal outfit.

The last time Mike stuck his neck out for progressive legislation was in 1946 when he voted for the continuation of the OPA. It almost cost him an election. Since then his voting has not been what you could call liberal. He is against the Brannan Plan, for Taft-Hartley and against civil-rights legislation. . . .

Oklahoma City, Okla. ROSS THOMAS

We suggest that Mr. Thomas study the *NR* voting supplement, November, 1949, to decide whether Senator Thomas has a better record than Mike Monroney, who recently captured his Senate seat. Thomas voted for aid to Spain, for a Republican move to cut reciprocal trade, against a liberalized Displaced Persons Act, against public-power funds—and managed to play the cotton market on the side.

Mr. Thomas is incorrect in his statement that Monroney has supported no progressive legislation since 1946. Last year, Monroney was one of the few Southerners who voted to abolish the poll tax. His voting records shows that he favors rent control, public housing, social security, an increased minimum wage, an extended reciprocal-trade-agreements act, and continuation of the Marshall Plan. He also voted against continuation of Taft-Hartley. – THE EDITORS

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VOLUME 123, NUMBER 10, ISSUE 1866, NEW YORK CITY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1950 **New Republic**

PERSONAL FREEDOM IN WARTIME

THE CONGRESS of the United States is preparing to enact a new sedition bill which, in its present form, would represent the sharpest break with our political traditions since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The bills offered by Senators McCarran (D, Nev.), Mundt (R, N.D.) and Ferguson (R, Mich.) and by Representative Nixon (R, Calif.) to deal with "un-American and subversive activities" and to "preserve the internal security of the country" are almost certainly unconstitutional in some respects and would be completely ineffective to achieve their stated purposes.

They would violate freedom of speech, due process and the other cornerstones of our civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. They would drive American Communists completely underground and make them a far greater threat than they are today. Passage of a new sedition law like one of these bills would degrade us in the eyes of our true friends in the United Nations and make a mockery of our stated belief in open discussion as the way to understanding among free men.

The sedition bill, first introduced by Representative Mundt on March 15, 1948, which in expanded form is the legislation now under consideration, would make it criminal to hold certain political beliefs. Under its "sedition" provisions, any person who shall "knowingly combine, conspire, or agree with any other person to perform any act which would substantially contribute to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship, the direction and control of which is to be vested in . . . any foreign government" would be punishable by a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both, plus ineligibility for public office. Legal authorities point out that this catch-all does not merely prohibit acts hitherto illegal, but might prohibit making a speech, writing a pamphlet, organizing a committee or writing a letter to a Congressman.

One authority believes that under this section "it will be a crime for two men to agree that one of them will run for Congress on a party ticket which a particular jury considers to involve a totalitarian dictatorship." Arthur Garfield Hays raises the question whether, if the bill becomes law, "a person who advocates its repeal is then performing an act which would substantially contribute to the establishment of such a dictatorship." Or, "If Mrs. Roosevelt again invites Paul Robeson to appear on her television program is she to be indictable?" If the Mundt-Nixon principle becomes law, all the Communist and Communist-front organizations will be required to register and make detailed reports. Three men appointed by the President, with no special qualifications and no judicial tenure, will serve as a "subversive-activity control board," to determine which organizations are "Communist" or "Communist fronts." In deciding on the proper labels, these three men are instructed "to take into consideration" a long list of factors, including "the extent to which a given organization is under the direction of . . . receives financial aid from . . . reports to . . . or owes allegiance to a foreign government," or, in the case of front organizations, the "extent to which" direction or financial support is received from Communist organizations, or their policies coincide with Communist policies.

The findings of the board can be appealed to a US District Court, but shall stand as conclusive "if supported by the preponderance of the evidence."

Once an organization has registered as Communist, its members cannot hold government jobs or obtain passports. Contributions to the group will not be tax deductible, and the organization is denied tax exemption for itself. Both registered Communist and front organizations must mark every publication sent through the mails as "disseminated by ——, as a Communist organization," and must identify their radio and television programs in a similar way.

Obviously, this registration provision will not produce any information which the FBI does not already have. The Communist Party has already announced that it will not comply with the requirement, and if this bill is enacted, the probability is that the party will simply go out of existence. In that case, nobody can be punished for failure to register. As for the present party members, the great Harvard scholar, Professor Zechariah Chafee, testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee:

> Anybody who has studied the history of Irish societies in the days of Daniel O'Connell can tell pretty well what will happen. Every time a particular society was declared unlawful, its former members started a new society to do exactly the same thing. We can expect the formation of a large number of Shakespearian societies, Dante institutes, chess clubs, indoor-baseball associations, etc. Meanwhile you will

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no longer know whether there are 70,000 who are Communists at heart—or 700,000. In short, if we are scared about the possibility of Communists under the bed, let us cling hard to the existing system, which encourages most of them to get on the bed where we can see them.

But the bill would go far beyond outlawing the Communist Party itself. The heaviest damage would fall on non-Communist liberal activity. An organization with a few Communist members, even though they were unknown to the others, could be designated a "Communist front." The definition is so loosely drawn that it could be applied to almost any association not limited to the orthodox and conventional.

An organization which supported any policy also supported by the Communist Party or by groups found to be fronts would itself be in jeopardy of being labeled a front. A spokesman for the CIO pointed out in his testimony during the hearings of the bill that:

> One of the criteria listed for identifying a Communist political organization is the extent to which it fails to disclose its membership. Labor organizations have learned through long experience that if the employer gets the membership list, he may use all sorts of means to dissuade men from joining the union. The Labor Board, recognizing that, has repeatedly held that employer attempts to get membership lists violate the act. Yet under this bill, the practice of labor organizations to conceal membership lists might identify them as Communist political organizations.

The State Department fears that the new passport and deportation regulations prescribed in the omnibus House and Senate bills would violate the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The broad definition of "subversives" would prevent the United States from serving as a place of political asylum, would flatly bar admission to the US of diplomats from such countries as Yugoslavia and Poland, and effectively end our chances of winning Russian satellites over to our side.

The Department of Justice has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the bill would not "withstand a judicial test as to its constitutionality." In the first place, it restricts freedom of speech, thought and political activity, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. And in the second place, under our constitutional system, the determination of guilt is left to the courts. For the legislature to pass a bill determining guilt violates the due-process clause and is a bill of attainder. In this respect, the proposed new control bill differs from the Smith Act which was used in the conviction of the 11 Communist leaders. The Smith Act prohibits advocacy of overthrow of the government but leaves it to the courts to decide when an organization or individual has done so. The finding that the Communist Party today constitutes a "clear and present danger" to this nation so great as to justify restrictions on rights usually protected by the due-process clause does not extend to the passage of bills of attainder.

President Truman has said that all that is needed to make our national safety secure against Communist activities is legislation to remove a few defects in the language of our present strong laws on treason, espionage, sabotage and conspiracy, and to give the Attorney General certain additional powers over aliens. If it is spying that Mundt, Nixon and McCarran fear, the way to deal with that is by punishing espionage. Had the Mundt-Nixon bill been on the books in 1948 when it was first offered, it would not have caught a single spy. It would not have caught Klaus Fuchs or Judith Coplon or Harry Gold. Such actions as those for which they were arrested can be uncovered only by intelligent counter-espionage.

Legal safeguards against legitimate possibilities of Communist sabotage or disruption are fully provided in the counter-proposal to the omnibus anti-Communist bill which Senator Magnuson (D, Wash.) and others have offered for the Administration. If protection against flying sparks from the war front were the true concern of the Mundts and Nixons, they would withdraw their bills in favor of Magnuson's.

Measured against the doctrines laid down by Jefferson, Holmes and others when America's basic beliefs were questioned in the past, the proposal of the Mundts and Nixons today stands out clearly for the cowardly thinking that it is. As Justice Charles Evans Hughes said:

> The greater the importance of safeguarding the country from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsible to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.

Thomas Jefferson told those who feared the French Revolution that "if there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where freedom is left free to combat it." Jefferson's way of allaying fear in his time would work again if we would act against real spies as he prosecuted Aaron Burr and dismissed Citizen Genet, and if we would defend our ideas against hateful ones from abroad by strengthening our own traditions of freedom as he sought to do.

A sedition bill could not stand so perilously close to enactment if Jefferson's faith were fresh in the minds of most Americans. The President has spoken calmly and with reasonableness against hysteria. But the fear and panic that dominate the Democrats in Congress are a

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sign that his Administration has failed in leadership even of its own party, under the pressure of an election year. "Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go," Truman cautioned Congress recently, "and that is down the path to increasingly repressive measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its citizens and creates a country where everyone lives in fear." If any version of the Mundt-Nixon bill is passed, the President's clear duty is to block that path with his veto.

MacARTHUR TRIES TO MAKE POLICY

GENERAL MACARTHUR seems not to be aware who is President of the United States. On the vitally important question of Formosa, he is doing his best to make American policy. The policy he would make would be disastrous in the extreme; he thumbs his nose at the United Nations, he would justify much of the Communist propaganda in Asia against "American imperialism," and his attitude constitutes an amazing degree of subordination toward his Commander-in-Chief in wartime.

MacArthur showed his hand in the message he sent to the Chicago convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. President Truman himself, as soon as he had read it, ordered the message withdrawn, and frantic efforts were made to keep it from being published. But these efforts were too late; an issue of *US News and World Report*, containing the full text, was already in the mail. The President himself fully realized the importance of the issue MacArthur has raised as to which one of them is running the war. He authorized a statement from the White House that it was he, personally, who had ordered the MacArthur message withdrawn and that the President is making American policy. He also sent a letter to Warren Austin, US delegate to the UN, reaffirming the fact that our policy toward Formosa is one of neutralization, and that we are making no political commitments regarding the future of the island.

MacArthur reveals his thinly-veiled contempt for the Truman-Acheson policy when he describes as "appeasement and defeatism" any policy other than unilateral United States action to defend Formosa. Those who disagree with him, says MacArthur, "do not understand the Orient. They do not grasp that it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership." This is the naked imperialistic jargon of Kipling and the days of the "white man's burden." It wasn't true in Kipling's day, and it isn't true now. The MacArthur line, if followed, would separate us fatally from the United Nations. It ignores a quarter of a century of growing demand by all Asia that colonialism be ended.

It seems clear that MacArthur's insubordination was a well-calculated gesture in an attempt to capture the leadership in American policy, on the theory that President Truman would be too weak to fight back. Moments of crisis like the present are always those chosen by the military, in any country, to take over. No doubt MacArthur will get the support of the Hearst papers, the Luce magazines, the China lobby and the right-wing Republicans who have always wanted a military-imperialist policy in Asia, a policy called strength but actually committed to the weakest and rottenest elements in recent Far Eastern history. President Truman is to be congratulated on his firm stand for the supremacy of law and the principles of the United Nations.

THE WEEK

A BRIBE FOR FRANCO

Congress has handed $62.5 million to Franco Spain despite the strong objections of President Truman and the State Department. Not a single Democratic leader in either the Senate or the House took the floor against the loan, written into the $36 billion General Appropriations bill. The Senate, earlier this month, overrode Administration objections and passed a $100 million loan to Spain. The Senate-House Conference Committee reduced the sum to $62.5 million and, at the same time, cut Marshall Plan funds, also tied to the measure, by $200 million. Only a last-minute appeal from President Truman averted a companion $11.9 million slash in his Point Four program. Truman sent a message to Speaker Sam Rayburn (D, Tex.) calling the Conference Committee's cut a "tragic blunder" and urging the House to pass the full $26.9 million for Point Four.

A handful of House members—Representatives Chet Holifield (D, Calif.), Emanuel Celler (D, N. Y.), Howard Smith (D, Va.), Jacob Javits (R, N. Y.) and Vito Marcantonio (ALP, N. Y.)—bitterly opposed the loan to Franco. But attempts by these opponents to get a record vote by the House were unsuccessful. The item was approved in two separate House standing votes, 165 to 90 and 164 to 80. Javits stood up in opposition on the Republican side of the aisle. There were some reports that Truman might veto the entire omnibus bill

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because of the mandatory loan, or impound the money. With Congress attempting to recess early this month until after the November elections, there is little time for reconsideration of the measure.

WHAT WILL RED CHINA DO?

Does Communist China mean to enter the Korean war? For a week or two there have been reports that a Chinese army of 200,000 men, with much heavy armor, has been poised on the Korean border, and there has been much speculation as to whether China and Russia could afford to stand by and see Communist Korea beaten in the field—a development which now seems increasingly probable. Then on August 27 came Peiping's angry notes to the US and the UN saying that American planes had strafed Manchurian cities, killing Manchurian citizens and destroying property. The US Air Force immediately denied the charge.

There are at least three possible explanations of the move. First: What Peiping says may be true. It is easy for airplanes to get off course: witness the bombing of cities by our Air Force in World War II. Second: China may be lying, trying to make as much trouble as possible without going to war. Third: This may be a propaganda attack preliminary to entering the Korean hostilities. At the moment, the first or second explanation seems somewhat more probable than the third. If China wanted to fight, she would have more to gain by doing so anonymously than by a blaze of publicity which would open her own cities to reprisal by air. And if she went to war, whether openly or furtively, she would of course destroy all hope of getting into the UN for years to come.

UNCLE SAM TAKES OVER

In announcing government seizure of the nation's railroads, President Truman was following a recommendation made long ago by Presidents W. P. Kennedy of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and R. O. Hughes of the Order of Railroad Conductors, that the government take over operation of the roads to prevent a national strike. The union presidents requested seizure because they believed that there was no possibility of a just settlement with the companies so long as the top railway executives refused to negotiate seriously on the workers' demands, and the union chiefs knew they could not indefinitely avert wild-cat strikes by their disgruntled members.

The hope on the part of the unions is that the dramatic act of government seizure will now force the railroads to deal seriously with what they consider legitimate grievances. The unions are optimistic about the chances of getting an acceptable agreement under these new conditions, and can be expected to continue to work under government supervision until a new contract is signed.

ALLOCATING SKILLS

Dr. Philip E. Adams, president of the American Dental Association, has urged Congress to empower the National Security Resources Board to establish and enforce basic ratios of medical, dental and other professional and scientific manpower for military and civilian needs in the event of a national emergency. Adams testified last week in support of a bill that would require the registration of all dentists and physicians up to the age of 45 and would permit the immediate draft of professional men who were trained at government expense or had been deferred during World War II to complete their professional education. The bill, introduced by Senator Chan Gurney (R, S. D.), is now pending before the Senate Armed Forces Committee.

Concern is growing over the serious shortage of doctors, dentists and nurses, both civilian and military, we shall face in the event of a long war (see the *NR*, August 28). Representative Andrew Biemiller's (D, Wis.) Emergency Health Training bill, which would have provided federal aid for medical schools, has been shelved by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee for the remainder of the session, by a vote of nine to eight. Biemiller called the tabling action "a great mistake" and said the American Medical Association, which has vigorously opposed all health measures in Congress, is primarily responsible for killing the bill.

Meanwhile, the Defense Department has asked Congress for authority to draft doctors and dentists. Unless a bill is passed before Congress adjourns, Defense Secretary Louis Johnson said he will not be able to draft men who vere trained at government expense but who never served, and will thus be forced to recall to duty in the next several months "substantial numbers" of reserve doctors who did serve in the last war. Representative Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has announced he will immediately introduce the doctor-draft bill submitted by Johnson.

WAGES UNDER INFLATION

Organized labor's greatest fear is that it won't be able to end the 10 to 15 percent inequity that now exists between wages and the cost of living. The great drive now is to win wage boosts in next year's contracts before any general freeze is imposed under a new price-and-wage-control law.

Government economists are hopefully pointing to the fact that prices are leveling off after the three-percent rise in living costs, largely due to soaring food prices, that occurred between April and July. They predict that prices are likely to recede for a time. But the unions are too much aware of how deeply the increase in the cost of living has cut into their real wages in the last two years to take much consolation from such statistical optimism.

Some of the recent union settlements indicate labor's state of mind. Pensions and insurance have been pushed aside, at least temporarily, for wage increases. The CIO packinghouse workers have accepted a two-year contract for a general wage increase of 11 cents an hour from Armour and Company, which ruled out pensions for the life of the contract. The United Rubber Workers have centered their fight on a request for a 25-cent general wage increase; the longshoremen, for an across-the-board increase of 10 percent. The Hudson Motor Company auto workers (CIO) have won a three-cents-an-hour wage increase on top of a five-year pension plan.

Most of the settlements since the Korean crisis have contained wage increases of from one to eleven cents an hour. But the over-all pattern will not become clear until the big steel and auto contracts expire this fall and winter. The CIO steelworkers will make sub-

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stantial wage demands when steel negotiations open November 1. The Ford contract expires January 1; Chrysler, whose contract expires July 1, grasped the nettle last week by voluntarily increasing wages 10 to 15 cents an hour for approximately 100,000 workers. The rise in the consumer index will result in an automatic five-cent-an-hour wage increase for General Motors workers on September 1, under their "sliding scale" contract.

ONE MAN'S POISON

"The speech speaks for itself," said Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews in defense of his Boston Navy Yard address.

No doubt about that. Matthews told the audience: ". . . We should declare our intention to pay any price, even the price of instituting a war, to compel coöperation for peace."

This proposal, politically unenforcible, legally indefensible, morally bankrupt, comes at the height of a struggle at Lake Success to assert the supremacy of political, legal and moral power over aggression. No one cleared the speech. The State Department has since repudiated it. The White House, as yet, has said and done nothing.

Henry Wallace was dismissed from the Cabinet four years ago for a pacific and conciliatory speech, on the ground that it conflicted with US policy. If Truman keeps Matthews in his Cabinet, he will in effect acknowledge that Matthews' demand for an ultimatum, followed by preventive war, is US policy. In that case we might as well concede defeat at Lake Success and go home. We shall have no claim left on the conscience of the world.

THE REPUBLICAN RECORD

The Senate Democratic Campaign Committee, headed by Senator Clinton P. Anderson (N. Mex.), hopes to make the Republican Party regret having used the Administration's foreign policy to attack Democratic nominees for the November election. The Committee has prepared a record of Republican and Democratic votes on 13 key measures proposed by the Administration from 1947 to the current session, plus the vote on 17 crippling amendments to these bills. The survey, not yet generally distributed, shows that the Democratic Party has been far more consistent in trying to halt Communism than the Republican.

The 30 key votes reveal that Democrats have supported the Administration's anti-Communist programs 87 percent of the time, while the Republicans have supported it only 62.9 percent. On major roll-call votes, Republicans went down the line to reduce interim aid from $597 million to $400 million, to reduce ECA authorization from $5.3 billion to $4 billion, to lop off similar sums from the ECA appropriations, to attach reservations to the Atlantic Pact, and to cut military aid.

The batting average of six Republican Senators, up for election this year, on the 30 foreign-policy and defense measures selected for the survey is:

Senator Robert A. Taft (Ohio), 53 percent; Henry C. Dworshak (Idaho), 17 percent; Homer E. Capehart (Ind.), 32 percent; Milton R. Young (N. D.), 44 percent; Forrest C. Donnell (Mo.), 71 percent; and Eugene D. Millikin (Colo.), 76 percent. Minority Whip Kenneth Wherry (R, Nebr.) voted only seven times for the Administration's measures and 23 times against, for an average of 23 percent.

The roll-call votes in the survey include those on: aid to Greece and Turkey (1947), the European Recovery Program (1948), ECA appropriation and extension (1948-49), the North Atlantic Treaty and military assistance under the pact (1949), ECA extension (1950), and the Point Four Program (1950).

Senator Anderson hopes the voters will study the record. "Baseball fans," he said, "know the rules by which the boys on the team are handled. If a player can't bat well enough in the big leagues he gets sent to the bushes. In this election the Democrats are planning to help send some of the weak hitters on foreign policy back to the bushes."

CAMPUS WITCHHUNT

The University of Illinois is sharing heavily in the current academic Red scare. At a state Republican convention in Peoria, State Representative Ora Dillavou spoke in favor of Harold "Red" Grange, who is a candidate for trustee of the University, saying that if elected, Grange will take care of the faculty's "50 Reds, Pinks and Socialists." He aimed his attack against George D. Stoddard, president of the University since 1946 and highly respected. When Stoddard demanded the names of the 50, Dillavou, in the Joe McCarthy tradition, proved unable to name one.

Stoddard has been subject to earlier similar attacks by Republicans. Herman Kogan, correspondent for the Chicago *Sun-Times*, reports that "they don't like some of Stoddard's appointments. For one thing, they think he has leaned toward men who worked in Washington —and in their minds anyone who has worked in Washington must be a 'New Dealer' and if he is a 'New Dealer' he is, of course, a 'bureaucrat' or a 'Pinko,' etc." Stoddard's critics also object to the fact that the President spends time away from the campus in service for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and that he didn't show proper enthusiasm over a proposed sports palace on the campus.

THE WASHINGTON POST

"Those are the flags of various gangster mobs and millionaires. Now shut up."

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OUTSIDE AMERICA

France's Georges Clemenceau, who knew a great deal about war and politics and the ways in which they can mix badly, once said war was too serious a matter to be left to the generals. Perhaps he was overstating the point. But a rather large number of Western Europeans have been saying recently that the mixture of war and politics involved in the present Asiatic situation is too serious to be left to General Douglas MacArthur, and they have felt they were understating their point. Formosa, these critics of MacArthurism believe, offers "a clear and present danger" to the "faith and confidence in American purposes" which Korea has helped restore in Western Europe.

The general has, of course, a crushing answer to his European critics: he says they are all defeatists and appeasers. If he were right, the number of defeatists and appeasers in Europe would be far greater than the number of Communists whom Senator McCarthy found in the United States. For, as the London *Observer*, a Conservative newspaper rather better known than the hero of Bataan for the sane moderation of its judgments, has pointed out: "Anxiety over United States policy in Formosa is now almost universally felt" and has not been mitigated by the statements of Truman, Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman and the general himself.

The fact is that the strength of Western European neutralism (which has amounted to the respectable front for less reputable defeatism and appeasement) has been ebbing slowly but steadily since the Korean fighting developed into a desperate slugging match. Western European morale, a vital element in the making of a dependable Atlantic Community, hence in the assurance of our national security, has been improving. The faint but unmistakable outlines of some sort of close Western European coöperation (if not unity) have begun to appear. And when MacArthur accuses his critics of trying to "promote disunity," he is interpreting Western European political realities about as accurately as he did North Korean military realities.

Seldom since the start of the Cold War have all Western European currents of opinion been as united as a common concern about MacArthurism has made them. For once, the French neutralists and the French Atlanticists, both on the Right and on the Left, have been speaking almost the same language.

The two greatest dangers of MacArthurism, as feared in Western Europe, are that it may lead to war between the United States and China, and that such a war, becoming generalized, would permit Russia to overrun both Asia and Europe. There is, moreover, a third danger, of special interest in and to Western Europe. It is that MacArthurism, by associating the Atlantic Community with Chiang Kai-shek, will stimulate Fifth Columnism both in Asia and in Europe. The *Observer* writes:

> Korea shows that in Asia, more than anywhere else, guerrilla warfare is not an incident of war but is an integral military arm as essential as artillery and dynamite. . . . Two million Chinese Communists, using precisely the same tactics as the North Koreans, toughened by the same qualities of doggedness and endurance, could do whatever they wanted anywhere in Southeast Asia.

To which the Manchester *Guardian* adds:

> The frequently repeated statements that the Formosans are "loyal" to Chiang Kai-shek's forces are inaccurate. . . . The Chinese Nationalists have laid upon them a far greater burden than ever their Japanese overlords did. . . . Hard pressed by the Nationalist armies, their standard of living reduced in order to feed them, and their young men impressed into the Nationalist ranks, the Formosans naturally have been receptive to Communist propaganda. There is little doubt they would give substantial aid to the Communist invaders should they gain a foothold.

Americans in South Korea know, even if MacArthur doesn't, that Radio-Peking was not merely spreading false propaganda when it described how some of the Koreans transport ammunition and supplies for the North Korean armies on their backs and in oxcarts. One broadcast said:

> At dusk the population starts moving along secondary roads, lanes, mountain paths, along thousands of roads which the American planes cannot reach. Another part of the population, as large as the first, spends the night repairing roads. No jet planes, no chasers, no bombers can reach this vast system of work on transport and repair, which vanishes in the countryside with the first light of day.

This may be an exaggeration; it is not, however, a lie. And anyone who has read the late George M. McCune's *Korea Today* (see the *NR*, August 14) will know why the guerrilla Fifth Columns in Korea work against soldiers who come from afar to free their country from the tyranny of Communism. In Korea it is not enough to come in the name of the United Nations, if one comes also with the burden of what Syngman Rhee stands for.

The British and the French, who have already had their bitter equivalents of America's experience in Korea, know that the United States will have long and terrible Asiatic nights filled with millions of men undoing the progress American arms may achieve by day, if the forces of United States liberation arrive with the dead weight of what Chiang Kai-shek and his good friend MacArthur stand for. They fear, moreover, that unless Washington's Formosa policy becomes truly American rather than MacArthurian, Asiatic Fifth Columnism may become so strong that it will release millions of soldiers from the Kremlin's Asiatic ramparts for use in Europe and the Middle East. They fear, finally, that the present unity of all currents of Western European opinion in opposition to American policy in Formosa may, in hurting the slow progress toward unity in support of American policy against the Korean and like aggressions, once more give a lease of life to Western European Fifth Columnism.

The Asiatic problem is too serious to be left to generals like MacArthur and to Senators who think like generals like MacArthur. As the *Observer* remarks, "The sensitive Asian mind is something that should be studied carefully even in the heat of war." But of course Englishmen and Frenchmen may not have studied carefully enough the minds on Capitol Hill that support MacArthurism. Perhaps that is just as well; perhaps study would lead to defeatism.

PERCY WINNER

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MISTAKES IN ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

by Richard A. Lester

CONGRESS HAS hastily constructed a Defense Production Act which differs considerably from the authorization to mobilize the US economy which President Truman requested. It will take Administration lawyers some time to determine exactly what Truman can and cannot do under this first grant of power for the Korean emergency. If the need for heavy military preparedness continues or grows, the President may find it necessary to ask Congress to clarify or extend this mandate. In any case, there are certain pitfalls, discovered during World War II, that it is tremendously important to avoid now.

If taxes are increased sufficiently, it may be possible to avoid price and wage controls: much depends on military developments. The possibility of avoiding federal controls is reduced, however, by two factors. Unlike 1939, our military preparations are starting from a situation of high-level employment. And this time a population conscious of wartime shortages and inflation is seeking to beat the controls, thus creating scarcities and price increases.

In the face of such a situation, the government should prepare for price and wage controls even though initial reliance is placed on fiscal policy and voluntary attempts at stabilization. History never exactly repeats, but that is no excuse for failing to avoid past mistakes.

From experience with economic mobilization in World War II, certain lessons should have been learned. They are:

¶ *Production controls should be concentrated in one agency.* Priorities, allocations and curtailment orders must be centralized; planning for materials should be coördinated with planning for manpower. Materials allocations and production curtailments are among the most effective means of allocating labor in the absence of compulsory labor service. Separation of the War Manpower Commission from the War Production Board in the last war was a serious mistake.

¶ *Controls should be placed in an emergency agency, not the regular federal departments.* Distribution of emergency controls among the regular departments destroys unity and proper coördination between materials and manpower, prices and wages. It, therefore, violates our first principle.

The old-line agencies often lack the proper approach to emergency problems. They are handicapped in recruiting personnel, and placing controls in them creates a suspicion of permanency. Superior personnel from outside the government is not interested in a job under a government hierarchy. A War Labor Board under the Secretary of Labor or a War Production Board under the Secretary of Commerce would suffer in prestige and be handicapped in operations. The regular departments try to avoid offending their regular clientele or supporters. Furthermore, both business and labor would fear that emergency powers in the hands of the regular bureaucracy would continue after the emergency had passed, whereas an emergency agency has every incentive to cease operations as soon as possible.

¶ *Nucleus operating staffs should be developed in an emergency agency at an early date.* Price and wage controls require a large, well-functioning staff to deal with the multitude of questions, issues and difficulties that arise when compulsory controls are instituted. Wage controls, especially, cannot be handled on a piecemeal basis.

Prior to the issuance of any compulsory orders, such nucleus groups can seek to obtain voluntary arrangements and compliance by industry and labor, can prepare any necessary and appropriate legislation, and can develop a qualified corps of operating personnel to handle priorities, allocations and price and wage controls.

¶ *Price and wage controls should be coördinated but handled differently.* Current legislative proposals violate this precept by tying wage controls to price controls and assuming that they should both be treated the same way.

A tripartite board is undoubtedly the best arrangement for wage controls, but not for price controls. Actually, wage provisions are only a small part of most labor agreements, which cover such matters as hours and overtime, shift differentials and reporting pay, seniority, grievance machinery, union security, pensions, health and welfare benefits, and dates for reopening and termination. The National War Labor Board and its regional boards often acted on a dozen or more different issues in a single case, with some substitution between the issues. Changes in some of the non-wage provisions of agreements may not affect costs to the company, or may reduce or increase them. Price administrators are generally not qualified to pass on the detailed provisions of labor agreements, nor can they be expected to know what compromise settlement would be most satisfactory to the parties whose relations are governed thereby.

¶ *Compulsory labor service would retard war production under our economic system, based on willing co-*

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operation. In a voluntary labor system resting on incentives and persuasion, the appropriate ways of directing labor are the regular means, plus governmental indications of need, patriotic appeals, and the use of civilian jobs as one criterion for possible induction under Selective Service.

Compulsory labor is dissatisfied and inefficient labor. Talk of freezing workers in essential industries would tend to dry up our greatest source of emergency manpower—recruitment from outside the labor force—as well as to discourage entrance into such industries or occupations. Another large source of manpower supply is to increase working hours, which would be less effective under compulsion. Talk of national service creates uncertainty and unnecessary labor turnover. Labor in nonessential production and service can be freed for more necessary work by materials priorities, allocations, production curtailments, and employment ceilings on business concerns. Compulsory transfer would raise a host of problems—housing, cost of moving, seniority, comparative exposure to risk of atomic attack, benefit rights, absenteeism, etc.

During the last war, Selective Service was not sufficiently discriminating in drafting people from critical occupations. In an atomic age, reserved occupations are more than ever necessary. Local draft boards cannot be expected to operate on the basis of technical judgments of skills and national needs for them, but a technical screening body should so operate at a higher level upon employer appeals.

Nucleus groups should be established now to decide many important operating and legislative matters. Uncertainty, rumor, and runs on consumer items are damaging to public confidence in the leadership in Washington. One pressing problem, for example, is whether industry and labor should be warned that any price and wage stabilization will be based on the month before the outbreak of the Korean war, as is stated in the Congressional bill. The month preceding June 25 is not so appropriate as a wartime stabilization base as was January, 1941, after price and wage adjustments to war production had occurred over a period of more than a year. Yet such an announcement would probably serve to curtail price and wage increases. An intelligent decision, based on all the relevant facts, should be made.

Action on these matters cannot wait until after the November elections. Already it is late for the development of effective operating groups to prepare for and handle any necessary economic controls. The news from Washington about current proposals for economic mobilization, however, indicates that not only have we failed to learn the economic lessons of the past war, but we may be about to commit a number of mistakes that were avoided last time.

WHAT IS MALIK UP TO?

by Joseph P. Lash

GENERALLY, when Communists have found themselves in a minority in an organization and unable to dominate its decisions, their tactics have been to worry that organization, bully it, tie it up in procedural wrangles, outrage and exasperate the other members to the point of driving them out, but never voluntarily to leave, themselves. On August 1, the Soviet Union conceded that its departure from this traditional practice, in the United Nations, had been a grievous miscalculation and it therefore abandoned the boycott begun in January over the issue of Red China's admission and prolonged through the first weeks of the Korean conflict.

From June 25 to August 1—when Jacob Malik assumed the Presidency of the Security Council—Lake Success had been a platform from which the free world denounced without challenge or contradiction the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea. Acting with rare unanimity and dispatch, 53 nations had labeled North Korea the aggressor, issued a cease-fire order, and approved armed action to repel the aggressors and restore peace.

No great mystery, therefore, attaches to what were Malik's immediate aims. While he has been unable by his return to reverse the earlier UN decisions, he has prevented the Security Council from considering further measures in support of the Korean Republic and in implementation of the decisions of June 25 and 27; he has used the sounding board of Lake Success to broadcast the Soviet version of Korean events; and by skillful manipulation of the China issue, he has not only moved the question of Red China's recognition back onto the center of the world stage, but split the unity which the non-Communist nations had achieved on the Korean issue.

He accomplished this by resorting to arbitrary rule-or-ruin tactics in the Chair, unparalleled in the history of parliamentary gatherings, tactics that brought from Warren Austin the anguished protest that "On the time of these poor boys over there who are under fire . . . we monkey and twist the rules of the United Nations Charter solely for the purpose of preventing progress toward peace."

Malik's cynical disregard for UN procedures began with his first ruling that the delegate of Kuomintang China did not represent China and therefore could not

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sit at the Council table. UN rules clearly specify that the credentials of a representative on the Security Council can only be approved or disapproved by the Council itself, and while the outcome was never in question, it took half a session to overrule Malik. On the vote he was supported by India and Yugoslavia, who regarded the substantive issue of Red China's admission as more important than the procedural question.

Defeated on this issue, the Soviet representative then blandly tried to impose his own agenda, on which the first item was again the question of Chinese representation in the UN and the second was what he called "the peaceful settlement of the Korean question." It took two and a half sessions to get the Council back to a discussion of the agenda point which had occupied it before Malik's return, namely, "Complaint of Aggression upon the Korean Republic." And the inclusion of Malik's China item only lost by a tie vote with five in favor (India, Yugoslavia, Norway, the United Kingdom and the USSR—all of whom have recognized Mao's regime), five against and one abstention.

The fourth session of the Council bogged down in the most exasperating procedural wrangle of all. When the Security Council on June 27 had voted to come to the aid of the Korean Republic, an invitation had been extended to that country to sit with the Council during consideration of the Korean question. Malik now proposed that a representative of North Korea also be invited. When the other Council delegates showed no inclination to reward North Korean defiance of the United Nations by inviting it to the Council table, Malik not only refused to permit the South Korean representative to participate, but would not even allow a vote on the question and called his reversal of the previous Council decision on South Korean participation a "statement of the situation."

President Truman's description of these Soviet tactics as a "filibuster" was also the view of most of the members of the Council, who emphatically agreed with the Norwegian delegate's declaration that Malik was deliberately seeking to prevent Council progress "from preliminary procedural wrangles to an orderly consideration and disposal of the issues before it." The object of the Soviet filibuster seemed plain: It was to delay Council action in the hopes of a South Korean Dunkirk which would immensely strengthen the Soviet bargaining position in negotiating a political settlement of the Korean issue. But if there is no Dunkirk, then Soviet tactics will have backfired. Malik's utter disregard for accepted procedures has hardened world opinion against the USSR, which will be in a less favorable position to influence the disposition of the Korean issue than it would have been with more conciliatory tactics.

The character of Malik's speeches has further helped to alienate world opinion, particularly in the West. Although Security Council action has been hobbled and paralyzed by procedural snarls, Security Council speechmaking has ranged far and wide and has covered in advance the substantive items which the Council has been unable to reach. Accustomed as the world has become in the period of Nazi and Soviet invective to brutality of utterance, disregard for facts and mendacious bluster, Malik's systematic vilifications and lies still come as a shock. At one point Delegate Antonio Quevado of Ecuador was so infuriated that he denounced Malik for talking to nations on the Security Council, "whip in hand as if he were conducting a gang of forced laborers under Asiatic conditions."

When Malik first attacked the United States as the aggressor in Korea the reaction in the Council was one of incredulity. When he returned to this charge, Warren Austin warned him that the Russians might regret it if the Council proceeded to find out "whose design and whose command" had launched the war. The next day the State Department finally dispensed with diplomatic niceties, and Austin was able to deliver his most effective speech in which, in the form of a simple catechism, he asked, "Who has the influence and the power to call off the invading North Korean Army?" And for the first time he put the finger directly on Malik with the answer, "The Soviet Union." He ended his catechism with the question, "What member of the Security Council is assisting the invader in the Security Council?" And again he gave the answer direct: "The Soviet Union."

The Russians are not comfortable under such plain speaking. They are aware that there is a growing conviction in the non-Communist world, which has been strengthened by Malik's UN tactics, that Communist expansionism cannot be dealt with by striking at its peripheral manifestations, and that the Kremlin itself must be placed in the judgment box. That is still not the policy of our government. Although Malik has repeatedly accused us of wanting to spread the war in Asia, our objective continues to be to "localize" the conflict. But if that policy should change, the Soviets can thank their own tactics, as was pointed out by James Reston of the New York *Times*, for "turning the world security organization into a vast anti-Comintern pact."

This is not to say that Malik's maneuvers and propaganda were without effect. America's greatest point of vulnerability during the August Council debates and maneuvers has been its position on China. Whatever the effect of Malik's speeches on the peoples of the West it is probable that they were not addressed to the delegates of the Security Council, or even to the peoples they represented. His speeches were primarily aimed at the peoples of Asia, and in evaluating their effectiveness it is important to bear in mind differences in levels

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of understanding as one moves from West to East. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate, could deride as "an attacking force of two" Malik's use of a photograph of John Foster Dulles and Ambassador John J. Muccio inspecting South Korean defenses to prove American aggression, but the photograph was none the less effective propaganda.

Moreover Malik's propaganda is more acceptable to the Asiatic peoples because of our continued dalliance with Chiang Kai-shek. General MacArthur's ill-timed visit to Formosa, with the attendant photographs of the Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea stooping to kiss the hand of Madame Chiang, far outweighed Malik's violation of UN procedures, in the battle to win Asiatic confidence in the disinterestedness of our actions. Americans regard the victory of the Chinese Communists primarily as an extension of Kremlin power and control, and so find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the recognition, and thereby the strengthening, of Mao's regime. But people who live differently think differently, and to the Asiatic peasant, Mao's victory is part of the great historic process of liberating Asia from white domination and himself from the war lords. Malik obviously anticipated, when he asked the Council to consider recognition of Red China in the middle of its consideration of the Korean question, that he would be defeated; but he wanted to identify our policy in Korea with our opposition to the "new" China.

Malik's use of the China issue against the US was, however, more than a propaganda maneuver. Whenever he tried to isolate the United States in the Security Council by tagging the armed action in South Korea as a United States aggression, there was some other delegate, as for example, Jean Chauvel of France, to point out that the action in Korea "is the action of the Security Council and not of the United States of America." But on the China question we received no such support, and while the United Kingdom and Norway agreed with us that Korea should be kept separate from the issue of China recognition, they felt obliged to vote with the Council minority to include China on the agenda. This Council experience should warn our policy-makers that any closer identification with the rump Chiang regime, particularly at the coming session of the UN Assembly, may irreparably compromise the moral authority of our position on Korea.

WESTERN UNITY: WHEN AND HOW?

by Michael Straight

FOR THE WESTERN democracies, survival has become a common problem: sovereignty will be shared in common or separately lost.

A Western Europe demoralized and divided against itself is no protection for America. A Western Europe federated as a separate and neutral entity is no better.

The necessity of Atlantic Union is no longer in question. Britain's Prime Minister has declared:

> We are approaching a formative and decisive phase in the organization of the Atlantic Community. This will require, by a more effective pooling of resources, the surrender, in an unprecedented degree, by each country of the ability to do as it pleases.

The questions are *when*? and *how*?

Continental concepts of law contrast sharply with Anglo-Saxon traditions: Germany remains authoritarian; for Italy, parliamentary government is still a tenuous experiment and due process, a revolutionary idea. Nations as far apart in outlook as the Atlantic democracies naturally seek the simplest form of coöperation—integration at the executive level of governments.

In executive integration, joint committees are created to carry out specific functions. Decisions are made only through unanimity. The committees have no original authority or independent existence. Their authority is gained from the fact that each member, in voting, commits the national government which he represents to the actions undertaken.

In wartime, combined boards of the Allies directed every phase of our joint endeavors, just as combined commands directed our operations in the field. In postwar years this pattern was recreated in the Organization for European Economic Coöperation. In defending the pattern, in the debate on the Schuman Plan, Sir Stafford Cripps declared:

> Ever since it was set up, the OEEC has been making progress in active coöperation, so that today the degree of mutual understanding and coöperation between its members exceeds that in any other association of nations ever known in the world.
>
> Two very major achievements stand to its credit. The first is the liberation of trade between the OEEC countries. . . . The second . . . is the series of European payments schemes culminating in the European Payments Union. This latter scheme has been a difficult one for [Great Britain], with its obligations to the Commonwealth and the rest of the sterling area, and we have gone a very long way to reach an accommodation.

Cripps of course is right. The clearing away of trade barriers among the free nations has been the indispensable first step toward closer integration. The European Payments Union is a vital second step toward the co-

This is the third of a series of articles under the general title, "Can the Atlantic Countries Unite?" The next will appear in an early issue.

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ordination of economic policies. The OEEC has done invaluable work, though a great deal remains, in abolishing the restrictions that still obstruct a third of Europe's trade. Already the OEEC has projected its planning beyond 1952. America and Canada have recently joined the OEEC as full members.

Is the OEEC enough to bind Germany's resources to the West, and to unify European defense production? The British stake their future on the OEEC pattern. A thousand little OEEC's crisscross Europe in a spider's web of committees, tying every conceivable combination of sovereign and independent nations in an abortive system of half-commitments and half-alliances.

In planning for common defense, the North Atlantic Council has employed the committee system. The Foreign Ministers meet in the Council on rare occasions; their deputies are on permanent assignment. The Ministers of Defense of the Council nations meet on the Defense Committee; the Ministers of Finance, on the Defense Finance and Economics Committee; the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each nation, on the Military Committee; the Ministers of Supply, on the Production Supply Board. Under the committees are the standing groups for Western and Southern Europe, and for the North Atlantic seaboard nations. At Fontainebleau they jointly maintain the nucleus of a potential combined command.

In the staffs of the planning group there are the beginnings of original executive authority. Yet neither in the resolutions of the Council, nor in the terms of the Atlantic Pact itself, is any transfer of sovereignty undertaken or contemplated.

Ernest Bevin christened the new community the Atlantic Brotherhood. "Democracy," he declared at the Council's last meeting, "is no longer a series of isolated links. It has become a cohesive organism."

The truth is, of course, that at present the Brotherhood is neither cohesive nor organic. The Pact calls on its governments to "unite their efforts," but offers no structure for unification. It calls on them to settle their disputes peacefully, but creates no mechanism for settlement. It declares that an attack against one is an attack against all, without implementing a combined defense.

The basic organizing principles of the Brotherhood, in Bevin's words, are:

First, that it consist of "twelve free, independent sovereign nations working together."

Second, that these nations are joined in "equal association" in which "the smallest nation among us is equal with the greatest."

These principles may have been politically expedient in 1949. In terms of effective action from now on, they are so far removed from reality, and so inadequate for our present tasks, that any structure raised upon them must be condemned to powerlessness and paralysis.

Europeans have believed that any closer integration of the Western nations rested on a rapprochement between Germany and France. Anxious to secure this, and seeking a way out of the quicksands of committees, the French have carried inter-government coöperation one stage further in the Schuman Plan. The French White Paper states:

> By pooling basic production and by instituting a new higher authority whose decisions will bind . . . member countries, these proposals will build the first concrete foundation of the European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace.

The plan was rejected by the British government. Its action was more deepseated and disturbing than the speeches of Labour Party leaders at first suggested. For, Socialist jargon aside, Cripps was speaking in the mainstream of British tradition in basing his attack upon the Schuman Plan on its supranational approach to Atlantic coöperation, and in restating the British alternative—the committee system.

> The European Payments Union . . . [Cripps argued in Parliament] is typical of what can be accomplished by a freely negotiated arrangement between governments. I am perfectly certain that if, in this case, some supranational body had attempted to impose upon us by a majority vote some payments scheme without any prior discussion between governments, it could only have resulted in complete failure and in our having to leave the organization.
>
> Participation in a political federation, limited to Western Europe, is not compatible either with our Commonwealth ties, our obligations as a member of the wider Atlantic community or as a world power. . . . Free and voluntary association and coöperation between the governments of Europe can best achieve the most stable results.

Cripps carefully avoids any rejection of an Atlantic federation. Yet Britain's commitments and tradition bind her to the "free and voluntary" approach. "We British are functionalists and not federalists," a Cabinet minister told me, pounding on the table. His unspoken conclusion was: "The rest of the world can like it or lump it; do things the way we do, or not at all."

For quick understandings, swift decisions, freedom of action in times of emergency, the committee system is superb. Every civil servant will swear by it—as every civil servant should. Economists, Treasury experts, diplomats and soldiers of fourteen nations have learned in ten years of war and reconstruction to work as members of a single team. Effective and devoted, they are uninhibited by public prejudice, unimpeded by legislative review, unambitious for more grandiose superstructures. In their own restricted world, Atlantic Union has long since been achieved.

However, democracy places a limit to the powers of civil servants, and, with it, to the effectiveness of the

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committee system. In the short run it works miracles; in the long run it suffers from four major defects.

¶ *First, the committee system is irresponsible.* Its members are civil servants, free from the responsibilities and the benefits of public participation and legislative scrutiny.

Where the executive and legislative branches of government are fused, as in Britain, this weakness is hidden. But where they are separated, as in France and the United States, it is at once apparent. The legislative branch, save in wartime, must always be on guard against the extension of executive power. It will naturally and rightly suspect an independent instrument of the executive and restrict its authority, even where substantial power is needed.

Since the committees themselves have no original powers, and will be granted none by legislatures, the executive branch of each national government becomes the sole judge of its own performance in fulfilling or ignoring committee directives. No authority, no discipline rests with the committee, and no sanctions—save the doubtful and dangerous sanctions of an irate American Congress withholding needed aid.

¶ *Second, the committee system is undemocratic.* The civil servants who make up the committee are trained in the management of nations rather than in the ways of democracies. Their greatest weakness is their inability to confront and master the necessity of informing, enlightening and educating the public in order that they can safely rely on the democratic will.

In tranquil years, when broad directives are set and problems consist of details, there is no need for constant reliance on public opinion. In years of conflict, when there are no clear directives, and great decisions turn on public attitudes, no organization, working in critical areas of international coöperation, can accomplish its ends without public guidance.

Once again, the problems are far less urgent for Britain than for other nations. Centuries of internal unity, of class rule, of continuous training in the management of a worldwide economic and political system, have led the British people close to a civil-service state. Party politics stops short of the civil service.

The British worker has an innate belief in the competence and judgment of the Oxford graduate in the Foreign Office; if China is lost to Communism, he remarks that no doubt the chaps did their best.

In contrast, a federal system like the United States, which pits legislative against executive, and state power against federal power, breeds an innate distrust among citizens in the competence and judgment of executive officials. Continuity in policy is rare, in any case, with one Congress ready to repudiate the solemn commitments of its predecessor. But the smooth functioning of the committee system breaks down completely when the citizens of Kansas City feel totally unmoved by the fact that on some joint committee they have never heard of, some unknown official and his counterparts from foreign nations, in their perfect understanding, have informally and privately agreed on a joint course of action for their peoples to follow.

¶ *Third, the committee system is uncreative*; that is, in terms of enduring achievements that outlast wars and emergencies.

In the First World War a substantial part of the resources of the Allies was pooled under committee management. Hopeful men like Sidney Webb saw in the committees a vision of world government, brought suddenly into being. It was short lived. At the war's end the committees were at once destroyed.

In the Second World War, combined boards were created to direct every phase of the joint war efforts of the Allies. Seeing both their promise and their limitations, some observers such as myself, who believed that world government would develop along functional lines or not at all, urged that the combined boards be broadened to include Russia, and made part of an over-all structure of the United Nations which would grow continuously, through the management of war and reconstruction, to the enforcement of peace. Instead, inter-allied coöperation was held at the committee level, and the committee structure was again destroyed at the war's end.

¶ *Last, the committee system is uninspiring.* The common need of the Western nations is for bold and imaginative thinking: the committee system instead reduces all ideas to the lowest common denominator set by its weakest member.

Our common need is further for leaders equal to our tasks; the committee system, by its framework of frustration and lack of authority, automatically excludes first-rate men. So Charles Spofford, who raised money for the Metropolitan Opera, fumbles Europe's mobilization, while Eisenhower, who led Europe to victory, raises money for Columbia.

Our common need is above all to build together a spirit of faith and dedication among the peoples of the Western nations.

"We fought the better," said Churchill of Britain, "because we felt with conviction that it was not only our own cause but a world cause for which the Union Jack was kept flying in 1940 and 1941. The soldier who laid down his life, the mother who wept for her son, and the wife who lost her husband felt a sense of being united with the universal and the eternal. . . ."

Bright flags, great leaders, inspiring ideas have moved men in the past. But who will be moved today to give up wealth, run risks and make sacrifices for the North Atlantic Council and the OEEC?

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HAROLD L. ICKES: *Politics* Ueber Alles

IT WOULD BE highly amusing to watch, from the sidelines, the shadow-boxing between the Republicans and the Democrats, if it were not for the fear that a misstep might further embroil us in still another war. The timing of the invasion of South Korea, coming as it did at the beginning of Congressional election campaigns, could not have been worse for us. This of itself goes far to prove that the North Koreans were not acting on their own, but were being masterminded by the shrewd brains of the Politburo.

A clever and customary tactic of the Communists is to divide the people in those countries opposed to their ambition to conquer the world. Even if the Kremlin did not deliberately set a match to the fuse in Korea at a time least advantageous to us, it cannot be doubted that the tension that is now developing between our two major political parties is highly pleasing to it. Militarily, we could not have been worse prepared than we were when we undertook to defend South Korea, and from a political point of view we were caught off base with the Democrats and the Republicans lining up for their biennial scramble for power.

President Truman has reappointed John F. Dulles a member of our delegation to the Assembly of the United Nations; but one Dulles does not make a bipartisan foreign policy. We may whistle to keep up our courage, but in fact a cleavage has developed between the two parties. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. may say that the pronouncement, signed recently by himself and three other Republican members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, did not mean that his party was taking a stand of its own on foreign affairs. However, we shall not have long to wait to see clearly a widening breach between the two parties on foreign policy. The GOP has to have some campaign issue, and what could be better than Korea?

It is all very well to say, as Senator Vandenberg so patriotically expressed it during the last World War, that "partisanship stops at the water's edge." This may have been true when the great Senator from Michigan spoke for his party on foreign affairs. However, there is no one of his stature to snatch the banner from his relaxing grasp and take over a leadership to which his lessening strength is no longer equal. And even Vandenberg, although he did not sign the statement of Lodge and his fellow Republican members on the Foreign Relations Committee, endorsed it in principle. Some Republican Senators go so far as to insist that there never has been bipartisanship, so far as Asia is concerned. Not a single Democratic member of the committee signed the Lodge statement. It is undoubtedly true that none would have signed, even if he had been given the opportunity to do so. If this split down the middle of the Foreign Relations Committee, on strictly party lines, does not mean a political campaign waged on the issue of Korea, then it has no meaning at all.

About the time that the Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee were distinguishing themselves from the Democratic majority, there was a meeting, in Des Moines, Iowa, of Republican leaders representing Midwestern and Rocky Mountain states. At this meeting, another issue was raised involving foreign affairs. A demand was made upon President Truman that he dismiss Secretary of State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson from his Cabinet. The reason for this was stated to be their ineptness and bungling in the events leading up to and culminating in the Korean War. Nor was this the first such demand to find expression in various parts of the country and even in Congress itself. The drive on these two men is bound to snowball. We may expect Acheson and Johnson, particularly the former, to loom more and more as issues in the current political campaign. On these issues, the Republicans can assume the offensive, which is always good strategy in a political campaign, especially if the defenders can be driven from one position to another. President Truman has announced in his spirited way that Acheson and Johnson will continue as members of his Cabinet so long as he is President. Whether this was the politic thing to say at the time, may be doubted. It is not unlikely that his defiant attitude will serve to emphasize an issue on which the Democrats have lost the advantage of maneuverability.

As a matter of fact, the Republicans are at least *particeps criminis* with the Democrats for what has happened in faraway Asia. Both parties are to blame for the difficult situation in which we find ourselves, for which reason both ought to stand shoulder to shoulder "at the water's edge." It could well be argued that, if the Administration has been entrapped in Korea and Formosa, it is because it has listened too much to Republican clamor. Republicans have demanded aid for Chiang Kai-shek and his gang, with Robert R. McCormick of the Chicago *Tribune*, William Randolph Hearst, and Roy W. Howard of the Scripps-Howard league—to say nothing of Henry R. Luce—leading the ballyhoo. They insist upon our plunging—beyond our depth if we do not have a care—into a mad adventure, 5,000 miles or more from our shores, the outcome of which no one can predict. At the same time, Republicans voted against aid to South Korea, the lack of which they seek to charge against the Democrats.

HAROLD L. ICKES

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

JEFFERSON AND MADISON

by George Dangerfield

IF CULTURE is a perpetual confronting of the present with the past, and the historian (narrowly defined) one who deals primarily with the politico-economic elements in this situation, it is hard to see what more the historian can do than provoke and enrich the spirit of inquiry. When Webster said "liberty *and* Union," what did he mean by liberty? When today's newspaper says "freedom of enterprise," what does it mean by freedom? The questions are simple to crudeness, but not the answers. If the historian can persuade someone to try to find the answers, who can say that he has not performed his cultural function? The past has no specific remedies to offer the present. Great dead men provide maxims, but not advice; great past events announce that nothing recurs. What is gone is gone. If there are to be laws of history, which can determine not only the past but to some extent the future of contemporary events, it is clear that there must be a closer alliance among the historian, the mathematician and the physicist than, in fact, exists.

JEFFERSON: THE SCENE OF EUROPE, 1784-1789, by Marie Kimball (Coward-McCann; $6).
JEFFERSON AND MADISON: THE GREAT COLLABORATION, by Adrienne Koch (Knopf; $4).
JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800, by Irving Brant (Bobbs-Merrill; $6).

Lacking this alliance, the historian believes that patient and devoted study of the accumulating—one might almost say the procreant—mass of source material lying in our libraries and museums does produce at times an interstitial change in the tissue of the past, and that this change influences contemporary thinking. He also believes that we must avoid interpreting the past in terms of what we expect of it, and that we must sometimes interpret the past in terms of what it expected of us. This is usually discouraging. The historian of 1950 is at least fairly certain that centralization is here to stay: but almost all the great public figures of the American past—liberals and conservatives, "capitalists" and "agrarians"—speak in the highest terms of laissez-faire, economic individualism, the creative energy of self-interest, etc. If there is to be an "American" centralization, what help will it get from this decentralizing chorus?

Here are three books about Jefferson and Madison, which tell us, naturally enough, that the problems of their times have no specific relevance to the problems of ours. But can we extract from the words and actions of those great men some active principles which might help to bridge or circumvent or abolish the abyss between them and us? Mrs. Kimball's *Jefferson: The Scene of Europe* is of almost no assistance. She devotes her energies to turning the past into something between a museum and a shrine: a collection of carefully labeled objects dedicated to the memory of a single human ("almost superhuman") being. It is only fair to add that this particular volume in her uncompleted biography deals with Jefferson's sojourn in France as American Minister, when he had little to do in a public way. As a private man, he was acquainted with some of the leading liberals and scientists in pre-Revolutionary France, and even played a minor, and moderating, part in the opening stages of the Revolution itself.

Mrs. Kimball may have adopted the thesis—which is perfectly tenable—that Jefferson's political ideals were all formulated before he went to Paris; and his own records are not illuminating. But a book which does not mention the positivism of Cabanis, or the Epicureanism of Madame Helvetius' salon, or touch upon the conversations with Tom Paine, would seem to declare that its author is not much interested in this phase of Jefferson's intellectual development. On the whole, Mrs. Kimball's book is a description of "Jefferson's" Europe, England, France. The Minister's comments, though not so breathless as the author's speculations as to what his comments might have been if he had made any, have a characteristic bouquet. (Of an arrangement of trees at Esher Park—"a most lovely mixture of concave and convex"; of the duties of a traveler—"take every possible occasion of entering into the houses of the laborers"; of Milan Cathedral—"one of the rarest instances of the misuse of money"; of the Bastille after its fall—"it stinks horribly," &c., &c.) The book is a guidebook, charming, reliable, and therefore of value; but the author leaves Jefferson where she found him. It is only the European scenery that seems to move.

Adrienne Koch's *Jefferson and Madison* and Irving Brant's *Madison: Father of the Constitution* do not suffer from this antiquarian spirit. But there is still something of the shrine in the arrangement of Miss Koch's book; and something of the museum in Brant's. I think his book—like Mrs. Kimball's, it is the third volume in an uncompleted biography—is in many respects remarkable, not only for its exciting scholarship, but also for its improvement upon its predecessors. It is more learned, but it is also more lively than they. At this rate, Brant may actually produce that peculiar rarity—a "definitive" biography which defines its central character. He may, but will he? The present volume is still encumbered with moribund detail, which might so easily have been exiled into a footnote or an appendix or dispensed with altogether.

The period he covers is the most spectacular in Madison's whole life. It begins with the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and ends with the Virginia Resolutions in 1798. It is an interesting study in political semantics. Madison (A) entered the Constitutional Convention with a decided preference for strong central government. Madison (B) modified this preference during the Convention. Madison (C) modified it still more while writing for *The Federalist*. In *The Federalist*, none the less,

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he still appears as a loose constructionist; and briefly, I think in Number 44 of *The Federalist*, we have a glimpse of Madison (D), who was a very loose constructionist indeed. Although he was the Father of the Constitution, Madison did not believe that he had fathered a sacred text. With its elaborate checks and balances, the Constitution was a grand example of eighteenth-century mechanistic thinking, but Madison believed that it could be made organic, capable of growth, susceptible to change. When Hamilton's funding system placed the federal government in a close and unseemly relation with a particularly shameless group of financial vultures, Madison (E) went into opposition. With Jefferson—who had returned from France "somewhat *whetted up* in my republican principles"—he became a strict constructionist in his attack on Hamilton's banking and tariff schemes. The culmination of the great Jefferson-Madison partnership was their defense of civil liberties against John Adams' Alien and Sedition Acts. Here the influence of Madison (F) was always on the side of Union. He was willing to declare these Acts "unconstitutional" but not "null." He deprecated all talk of secession. He was beginning to return to nationalism and loose construction.

Even if he made a fearful mess of the War of 1812, James Madison was a practical statesman: and he may well have suspected that the Hamiltonian funding and banking system—for all its evident nastiness—actually *was* the American Revolution. It found the United States of America a mere manifestation of the peripheral break-up of the British Empire; it left the United States of America a respectable (though not respected) member of the society of nations. James Madison, as his Presidency shows, was a moderate capitalist —which is where he enters the mainstream of nineteenth-century history. One might go even farther. In Number 44 of *The Federalist* he shows a vague leaning toward the notion that political activity must be coextensive with economic activity, which suggests that if he had been born into a late instead of a very early stage of liberal capitalism he might have been as eager to check the exuberance of business enterprise as he was, in fact, disposed to encourage it.

But this is to take him clean out of his context. Brant tells us that he was not a doctrinaire, and not a worshiper of the past; and that he believed in the principle of expedient change. Jefferson was not a doctrinaire, either. He, too, believed in expedient change. However, he was always a moderate, and sometimes an immoderate, agrarian: contextually, he tried to cancel the nineteenth century before it had well begun. More subtle, curious, copious than Madison—though less learned in political science—he does not fit into any scheme. Jefferson was always Jefferson (X). On the perhaps inadmissible hypothesis that their *kinds* of thinking could exist today, one can be sure that Madison would have been the more comfortable in the America of 1950.

Jefferson, however, violently believed in change. Nothing is more interesting in Miss Koch's *Jefferson and Madison* than her admirable chapter on Jefferson's announcement, from Paris, of his new credo, "The earth belongs always to the living generation." I call this a credo because it seems to me that it was a religious act. When Jefferson spoke of "Nature and Nature's God" he meant what he said. Between his concept of Nature and ours (if we have one) there lie such enormous realms of biological and geological discovery that we can apprehend what he meant by "natural" rights only if we translate the word "natural" into "moral"—a strained and inaccurate translation at best. Jefferson sincerely believed (*i. e.*, it was not an abstraction with him) that the world had been created in six days, and that each generation reënacts the Sixth Day—that it starts out with a clean slate, upon which it may write what it pleases. It remained for him to discover what was the life span of a generation; and in Buffon's tables, he believed that he had found the answer. A generation, he concluded, lasts for eighteen years and eight months. From the axiom "the earth belongs to the living," therefore, he derived three chief corollaries: one, that if employment cannot be found for them, the unemployed have the right to labor the earth; two, that constitutions and laws must be revised every nineteen years; three, that no public debt should be contracted which cannot be liquidated within a similar period. The first corollary was always practicable, as can be seen if we study the history of the public domain; what the second and the third would have done to the American nineteenth century is beyond guessing.

Thus Madison, with his loose construction, and Jefferson, with "the earth belongs to the living," appear to sanction experiment, innovation, and freedom from the past as important factors in the "American way of life." Jefferson, it is true, would have been most uneasy with an experiment which seriously threatened his agrarian paradise, or with a set of facts which undermined his concept of nature. Industrialism always made him a little sick; and he believed that the sole function of geology was to discover useful minerals. His natural philosophy, however, was not individualistic, and though, as a child of the Enlightenment, he was bound to be an economic individualist, we cannot positively say that he would have disapproved of collective action.

Miss Koch's *Jefferson and Madison* is a book of ripe and original scholarship; it is brief; it is imaginative; it is easily accessible to the general reader. As I have suggested, however, there seems to be too much of the shrine in its arrangement. Two-thirds of it is devoted to Jefferson and Madison when in opposition, and only one-sixth to Jefferson and Madison when in power. Now great men in opposition are usually more heroic, inspiring and consistent than great men in power: they are also, on the whole, less interesting. It was while they were in power that Jefferson and Madison gave practical proof of their willingness to change with the times. The Louisiana Purchase—very nearly an executive *coup d'état*—sits oddly upon a man whose dislike of central government sometimes amounted to a distaste for any government at all. The legislation which implemented the Embargo Act of 1807 hardly squares with Jefferson's devotion to civil liberties. Madison's chartering of the second Bank of the United States has a weird appearance when contrasted with his furious attack upon the first. Miss Koch's justification of these events—on practical rather than moral grounds—seems to me entirely reasonable; but the fact that she devotes so little space to

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them suggests that she prefers to present her great men as heroes rather than as public figu:

Then again, she indulges in special pleading. For example, she mentions Jefferson's attempt to insert an abolitionist clause into the Constitution of Virginia, and she says that this intention should be noted by all who remember him as a "slave-holding Virginia planter." However, he *was* a slave-holding Virginia planter, and his proposed Constitution for Virginia was written in 1783, before the invention of the cotton gin. He remained an abolitionist to the end of his days; but you cannot read his correspondence during the Missouri crisis without realizing that his thinking on this question had deteriorated between 1783 and 1819. Do great men need haloes? And she quotes with approval his phrase "an empire for liberty"—an excusatory description of the United States with the addition of the Louisiana Purchase. This slogan, she says, is "packed with momentous meaning for our future." But what does the slogan mean? Presumably to Jefferson in 1803 it meant an empire which exported produce and precepts, but not manufactures; it meant an empire for free-holding farmers, who were content to mix their labor with the soil and who refrained from using legal devices for acquiring their neighbors' land; it meant an empire for slave-holders who were willing, sooner or later, to emancipate their slaves and pack them off to Santo Domingo; and it meant an empire *not* for bankers, Chief Justices, industrialists, proletarians or priests.

But these are minor objections to an informed and valuable study. Whether Brant and Miss Koch have extracted from their eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century contexts any fresh principles is another question. Perhaps there are no more to extract. I rather wish that Miss Koch had cited the Embargo Act as an example of Jefferson's cardinal belief that political democracies must sometimes construe self-interest as self-restraint and happiness as austerity. The Embargo, it is true, laid an impossible burden upon the people: but the belief remains. It is from this Act that one sees emerging the image of a political democracy as a sort of acrobat walking a tightrope in a high wind, with material wealth at one end of his balancing pole and human rights at the other.

The great value of both books seems to me to be their exploration of the experimental side of Jefferson's and Madison's statesmanship. If we try to apply Jefferson's "the earth belongs to the living" to the present day, we would have to stand the phrase on its head. We would have to change Jefferson's taste for frugality into liking for abundance. We would have to reverse his notions of the public debt. We would have to introduce into his political philosophy the upsetting concept of the propertyless man. But, granted that these things could be done, he would then most certainly inform us that it is not possible for a democracy to advance looking backward. From the Civil War up to the New Deal most public men—even very progressive public men—formulated their programs in terms of a *return* to the freedoms of the past. "The earth belongs to the living," with its eccentric corollaries, is the one unbreakable link between Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt.

In times of doubt and insecurity, how consoling it is to seek the heroic embrace of past events, and to lay one's aching forehead against the bosom of great and humane men. Jefferson was a very great and humane man. But still . . . innovation, experiment, self-restraint, austerity. Those who, in a fit of sentimental nostalgia, fly for comfort to Jefferson's bosom, ought to be warned that it isn't a very comfortable place.

George Dangerfield, historian, is now at work on a book, tentatively titled The Era of Good Feeling, *to be published by Harcourt, Brace.*

SIMPLE'S DIALOGUES

SIMPLE SPEAKS HIS MIND, by Langston Hughes (Simon and Schuster; cloth, $3; paper, $1).

"LISTEN FLUENTLY——"

Speaking is Jesse B. Semple, known as Simple to his friends—and fluently does the reader listen. For Simple is a likable guy; he has humor, sensitivity, intelligence, and something to say; he is the voice of the American Negro as few have heard him speak.

Langston Hughes knows and loves the people of Harlem, and others like them throughout the nation. He knows that though they do not speak with eloquence, theirs is the most profound understanding of what race prejudice means. Consequently he has created their symbol, a Negro Joe Doakes, to say what all of them have on their mind. Forty-four of these dialogues, which appeared originally in the Chicago *Defender*, the *New Republic* and *Phylon*, comprise the book.

Because most of these columns were written for a Negro audience, they are uninhibited, intimate, to the point. The white reader gets a rare insight into the private conversations of Negroes. Dominating the conversations, of course, is Simple, whose irresistible tongue wanders incisively over such topics as the Harlem riots, lynchings, Jackie Robinson's appearance before the House Un-American Activities Committee, The Law, why Simple can't hope to be President, the relative treatment accorded dogs and Negroes, and Simple's family life. We also come to know his friends: Hughes, who invariably comes off second-best in arguments with the hero; Joyce, his wonderful girl; his landlady; and Zarita, the *femme fatale.*

Simple makes such priceless understatements as, "White folks is the cause of a lot of inconveniences in my life." Comes World War III, he wants to reverse the usual process and "see some Negro generals pinning medals on white men." In one of his moments of cynicism, Simple wishes the Lord would smite all white folks down, with one exception: "I hope he lets Mrs. Roosevelt alone."

The best dialogues are those in which Hughes, as the supercilious straight man, disagrees with the things Simple has to say. In some of the others, we feel the cards have been stacked against us—even though we know the things discussed are true.

Unfortunately, segregation begets a degree of "segregated" humor. There are hilarious passages in this book which no white American will be able fully to appreciate. But to people who would like an idea of what the ordinary Negro thinks about the world in general, without frills and without pretension, the book will be a revelation.

WILLIAM GARDNER SMITH

William Gardner Smith, author of Last of the Conquerors, *is a reporter for the Pittsburgh Courier. His second novel,* Anger at Innocence, *will be published this fall.*

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FATEFUL YEARS

INCREDIBLE TALE: THE ODYSSEY OF THE AVERAGE AMERICAN IN THE LAST HALF-CENTURY, by Gerald W. Johnson (Harper; $3.50).

THE SHOOTING has started, and perhaps some of the answers are here.

If there is even one bit of knowledge that the thunderous century has taught its victims with a certainty beyond dispute, it is that in a democracy the average man takes a holiday from thinking only at infinite peril and immeasurable cost. . . . Because we failed to study the man Lenin seriously and assiduously; because we failed to comprehend the power of his false doctrine and to counter it with more powerful truth . . . now we are in serious trouble. No man can see the end of it. . . .

That is one side of the coin now in its fateful spin. This is the other:

For everything that had happened in America [Lenin] had an explanation derived from the writings of Marx. . . . There is no reason to doubt that Lenin was perfectly sincere in his opinion that the American was quite transparent and therefore not worth detailed study. Nor was there any compelling reason, from his standpoint, why he should exert every effort to make his ideas comprehensible to Americans. According to the Marxian idea the United States was merely an offshoot of the European capitalistic system . . . infected with the incurable malady of capitalism and therefore . . . inevitably doomed. If there was nothing important, except technology, that Russia could learn from America, neither was it supremely important to cultivate the sympathetic understanding of adherents of a dying system.

Lenin's error, Johnson writes, was the historical equivalent of Alexander's drunkenness. So, he might have added, is our own; and now the horrors are upon us. Johnson's book is in part the story of what brought them on, and in part an account of the developing political wisdom with which Americans may fight them off.

Shrewdly and wittily told, it is a story which he unfolds as a synoptic view of these 50 years as reflected in the four giants, Wilson, Lenin, Roosevelt and Stalin, some of whose doings Johnson has chosen to inspect. As one reads these pages against the current headlines and their threat of things to come, one becomes aware of a frightening gap —not in the telling, but in the tale itself: Americans have never had a really tough time of it, in sharp and willing sacrifice in the face of sustained and present danger. With such a time now near, the average American seems instead preoccupied with 50 pounds of sugar, a 99-inch television set, a new car in a hurry, and a soft seat for a soft fanny.

To the question whether the average American will brush these things aside before somebody else takes them away from him, Johnson provides timely and sagacious materials for an answer. A book for all average Americans, it should be especially valuable to those of an age to go to war. ALAN MARSHALL

Alan Marshall, formerly on the staff of Newsweek, worked for the OWI and the State Department in England, Eire and Germany during and after the war. He now contributes to magazines and teaches journalism at Boston University.

MUSIC: Made in France

THE FIRST American performance of Jacques Ibert's opera comique, "Le Roi d'Yvetot," given at Tanglewood early in August by the opera department of the Berkshire Music Center, served mainly to demonstrate the near impossibility of transplanting the French lyric stage to the United States. Nobody connected with the production understood much of the style and spirit of the opera, or the tradition of theatre music to which it belongs.

The stage director (in the sabbatical absence of Boris Goldovsky), F. Cowles Strickland of the Stanford University faculty, treated the ensembles—of which "Le Roi d'Yvetot" is largely composed —much as though he planned to send photographs of the production to the annual Tributary Theatre issue of the old *Theatre Arts* magazine. He tried to dress up the stage without, seemingly, having read the libretto carefully enough to find out what the lines and action meant. The conductor, Jan Popper of the University of California at Los Angeles, failed to pace the music with enough spirit, and kept his nose buried in the score so continually that he could not give much help or stimulus to the people on the stage.

The singers had been properly coached to reproduce the correct notes, but they delivered the English translation with appalling care to be intelligible, and as a result the lyric flow of the very pretty music was obstructed. The translator, Henry Reese, vacillated between filling out trite rhyme patterns and endeavoring to limber up the diction with coarse touches of Americanese. Except in the orchestra pit, where a student orchestra inferior to those in other years nevertheless struggled honorably to measure up to the presumptions of the vivid instrumentation, little that happened bore much relation to the work Ibert conceived. Out in the audience, Ibert, wearing a beret and a short raincoat, sought to look happy as he sat the evening out with Serge Koussevitzky, under whose administration the miscarriage of operatic justice took place.

Virgil Thomson, in the New York *Herald Tribune*, has often complained of the neglect of French lyric drama in this country. The literature of the last hundred years at the Opera and the Opera-Comique should be made familiar here, he maintains, because it illustrates forcefully the equal partnership of music and drama which is the present aim of Gian-Carlo Menotti, Thomson himself, and other composers for the American opera-theatre.

If he had heard "Le Roi d'Yvetot" at Tanglewood, Thomson would have realized how stubbornly the very qualities that make French opera perfect for its own audience resist transmutation into the terms of another language and culture. The satiric edge of the libretto, a *jeu d'esprit* about politics and revolution laid in the fourteenth-century principality of Yvetot, was hopelessly dulled. References to legend and parallels with history went over the heads of the audience; the English words substituted slapstick for wit; and the actors indulged desperately in horseplay in an effort to make the story funny on the surface, since they could not get to the heart of it.

"Le Roi d'Yvetot" itself, as far as

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I could judge by looking beyond the particulars of the Tanglewood production, is a bright and blithe little work of the kind that keeps the Opera-Comique going when it has nothing more ponderable on its mind. For the most part, Ibert is not gifted with winged inspiration. But he can write tunes that sing and dance—the Napoleonic folk ballad entitled "Le Roi d'Yvetot" figures importantly, along with the composer's own melodies—and he can make something clear and sonorous of an ensemble of soloists and chorus. At its best, his orchestration is ravishing, and it is always cleanly scored and nicely related to the volume and texture of the vocal parts. Ibert also commands the craft of keeping a musical stage piece alive by well-planned shifts in pace, dynamics and density. He knows his business, and "Le Roi d'Yvetot," properly done, should be fun for everybody.

The opera was staged in token of Ibert's presence at the Berkshire Music Center as a visiting instructor in composition. I am sure his influence upon the younger generation of get-famous-quick composers has been salutary. He is an admirable representative of the central tradition of French musicianship, which demands thorough technical competence in every nook and cranny of the musical profession. In the view of this tradition, a lack of novelty can be forgiven in a composer, but not a deficiency in journeyman skills.

The students at Tanglewood to whom the full exigencies of the composer's vocation have been revealed—at least by example—by Ibert this summer and by Olivier Messiaen and Darius Milhaud in other years, should have learned the most important preliminary lesson of all. Those who have merely turned into sophisticated Francophiles probably were never worth bothering about anyway.

CECIL SMITH

MOVIES: Very Clever

YOU PROBABLY have all heard of the movie producer who said to a novice director, "I understand you are a very clever genius." For a long time I ignorantly supposed that this story was meant to exemplify the producer's peculiar use of language. I have recently come to realize that "a very clever genius" is a species specially cultivated in Hollywood. The makers of "Sunset Boulevard" are very clever geniuses.

Consider that the film has a Hollywood background, treated with a snooty depreciation which establishes its up-to-dateness; that it is tough, unpleasant and melodramatically macabre, which establishes its "realism"; that it employs Gloria Swanson as an ex-silent-movie star and Eric von Stroheim as a one-time pioneer movie director, which proves its showmanship.

Do you want quiet, documentarily unhighlighted acting? "Sunset Boulevard" offers it in the person of William Holden. Do you want facially extravagant and vocally violent acting? Gloria Swanson supplies it. Do you want the contrast of honest simplicity? Cecil B. de Mille as himself furnishes it in one of "Sunset Boulevard's" better moments.

Swanson plays a passé movie star who, though still wealthy, lives in Hollywood in splendidly insane isolation, dreaming madly of a fantastic return to glory through the aid of a talentless young writer, whom, because of his good looks, penury and weakness, she is able to seduce into living with her as a lover, and whom she finally kills.

Miss Swanson undoubtedly has a certain amount of the flamboyant grand manner which is supposed to be characteristic of her heyday, although I am convinced that the Swanson of that time acted her old pictures with greater restraint than she is asked to display in her present one. This in a sense is part of "Sunset Boulevard's" cleverness. The producers, realizing that picture audiences unconsciously yearn for a little more expression than is common on the lacquered faces of the contemporary screen stars, make Miss Swanson emote with a physical abandon that the moviegoer will respond to as an unexpected and perhaps pleasurable shock. If the method isn't altogether natural and the result only occasionally real, it can easily be argued that Miss Swanson is portraying a near psychotic who finally makes the grade.

"Sunset Boulevard" exercised a definite spell on a very diversified audience, which I can only interpret as a fascination with the horrible—intellectually justified on the grounds that the picture is a study in decadence. Except for one brief moment—Miss Swanson's most valid bit of acting aside from her little imitation of Chaplin—where she lies in bed after her attempted suicide, I find none of the pathos which many people claim for the picture. In fact, part of the picture's cleverness lies in the manner in which it avoids expressing anything. For its central character gives little sign of ever having been more than a glorified nitwit. We are asked to take everybody's word for it that she was once "great," but unless you believe that Norma Desmond may be Gloria Swanson herself, you cannot accept this assurance.

Certainly the Norma Desmond of the picture cannot win our sympathy, since she is not only thoroughly deluded but humanly repellent. The truth is that Norma Desmond, even if she is compounded of traits that have been collected from "real life," is as phony a creation as the Biblical characters in de Mille's ancient epics—which he is still seen shooting in "Sunset Boulevard" when he tells Norma Desmond that pictures have changed a lot since the old days.

Miss Desmond's hapless consort, the murdered narrator of the picture, is a crumb and a jerk, and no scene, with the possible exception of those already noted and the one in which the star visits the Paramount Studio stage, has anything more than an oblique relation to reality. The writing throughout is synthetic—wise-guy, hollowly disenchanted, pertly humorous and oddly flat, as if the smartest cracks of all the hit plays, radio programs, talking pictures, magazine stories and café anecdotes were set end to end and passed off as sober statement. All calculation, the picture reveals no trace of either love or hate. Its feeling is pure celluloid.

If "No Way Out" helps even in the slightest degree to do away with anti-Negro prejudice, I shall certainly cast my vote for it. If it were possible to make one, I should be glad to see a

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statistical report on this subject. I am eager to believe that the picture will do some good. There are lines in the dialogue that should strike home.

Yet I cannot truthfully say that I enjoyed it. Its quality is almost unremittingly sadistic: when it was over, I was in a mood to kill—blacks, whites, the producers, and practically everyone else. On the reflective side, I doubt that a psychopathic Negro-hater or hoodlums who organize race riots are representative of the Negro problem. Race prejudice is most nefarious on its politer levels. No one will get proper people who happen to be infected with it to believe that their hostility to Negroes is in any way related to that of the bums in the picture. Sidney Poitier, who plays the lead, is excellent, as are most of the other Negro actors.

After these more "important" films, it was a distinct relief to see Walt Disney's English production of "Treasure Island." It tells its delightful tale in direct, non-arty, colored images that always are strictly germane to the unfolding of the story. One watches the picture with the healthy attitude of a child following it breathlessly from moment to moment without asking oneself what its point may be, and without the sense that the pleasure we take in it needs justification. Yet if one cares to think about it beyond its own frame, I should say that "Treasure Island" is a fondly jolly tribute to British virtues. Even its pirates are gentlemen as well as the heartiest of good fellows. Effortlessly, it achieves a real style—a style that incidentally might have served and improved many scenes in the current stage revival of "Peter Pan."

HAROLD CLURMAN

Robert Hatch is now on vacation.

THEATRE

Tidbits

GARSON KANIN'S "The Live Wire" (at the Playhouse) is a comedy about a group of young and fairly indigent actors who have taken over a Quonset hut to live together on a coöperative and communal basis. They constitute a lively and friendly fellowship until an aggressively selfish companion, who uses their aid to get himself a fat movie contract, moves in on them to sully the mood of warm comradeliness.

There is an idea in this which relates to a preoccupation that Kanin reveals in most of his plays: the world of good fellows is nearly always poisoned by the power-hungry ones, or, to put it another way, the heels inherit the cash and the kudos; the humble inherit their own goodness.

In "The Live Wire" this theme is presented in almost baby terms, like a kind of good-natured, hard-luck story that one actor might tell another at a bar. The atmosphere of the play is genially kiddish with many wry wisecracks and a sequence of something like specialty numbers—most of them very funny. There is the feeling of an adult-camp revue here, a faint but not unpleasant amateurishness. The play is easy to take, except when the plot and the theme grow insistent and the thinness of the characterizations becomes uncomfortably apparent. The cast is generally sympathetic and proficient.

"Borned in Texas," by Lynn Riggs, the third of the Festival Theatre's offerings, closed after only eight performances. The play, under the title of "Roadside," was first produced 20 years ago by Arthur Hopkins, and had an equally short run then. Though neither production was satisfactory (the Festival Theatre's was the better of the two), I believe the fault lies not so much in the play itself as in the New York theatre environment.

"Borned in Texas" is literally a country piece, like a delicate cowboy song or an engaging minor poem—very slight in texture—which can only be given for a small audience wholly congenial to its material. It is an essentially wistful and nostalgic play—a memory of Oklahoma in the early days of the century—combining a certain feminine touch with a gusty muscularity. In New York these days neither actors nor audience are attuned to such a play.

I saw it on the second night, when the company was visibly let down by the brutal reception the play had received from the press, and only Daniel Reed as a skittish village judge had retained the edge of his performance. He was capital.

HAROLD CLURMAN

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